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Abstract
With the growing Cyber threats, the need to develop high assurance Cyber systems is becoming
increasingly important. The objective of this paper is to address the challenges of modeling and detecting
sophisticated and diversified network attacks. Using one of the important statistical machine learning
(ML) techniques, Hidden Markov Models (HMM), we develop two architectures that can detect and
track in real-time the progress of these organized attacks. These architectures are based on developing
a database of HMM templates and exhibit varying performance and complexity. For performance
evaluation, in the presence of multiple multi-stage attack scenarios, various metrics are proposed which
include (1) attack risk probability, (2) detection error rate, and (3) the number of correctly detected
stages. Extensive simulation experiments are used based on the DARPA2000 dataset to demonstrate the
efficacy of the proposed architectures.
Index Terms
Cyber systems, network security, intrusion detection, Hidden Markov Model, interleaved attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large organizations face a daunting challenge in providing security to their Cyber-based sys-
tems. Modern Cyber-based infrastructures typically consist of a large number of interdependent
systems and exhibit increasing reliance on the security of such systems. In the present threat
landscape, network attacks have become more advanced, sophisticated and diversified, and the
rapid pace of coordinated Cyber security crimes has witnessed a massive growth over the past
several years. Cyber attacks can affect and downgrade functionalities and missions of critical
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2infrastructures [1], [2]. For instance, in December 2015, hackers were able to successfully com-
promise information systems of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine and temporarily
disrupted power supply to consumers [3]. Another recent incident was in May 2017 where the
“WannaCry” ransomware attack was detected after it locked up over 200,000 servers in more
than 150 countries [4]. A month later, another version of the same attack caused outages of
most of the government websites and several companies in Ukraine. Later on, this attack spread
worldwide [5].
With the explosive growth of Cyber threats, there is a dire need to develop high assurance
and resilient Cyber-based systems. One of the most important requirements for high assurance
systems is to develop advanced and sophisticated attack detection and prediction systems [1].
Security reports reveal that, over time, the type of network intrusion has transformed from the
original Trojan horses and viruses into more complex attacks comprising of myriad of individual
attacks. These attacks follow a series of long term steps and actions, and are called multi-stage
attacks and, therefore, are hard to predict [6]–[8]. In these attacks, an intruder launches several
actions, which may not be performed simultaneously, but are correlated in the sense that each
action is part of the execution of previous ones and are aimed at a specific target. The detection
of multi-stage attacks poses a daunting challenge to the existing threat detection techniques [1].
This challenge is exacerbated if multiple of these attacks are launched simultaneously in the
network originated by a single or multiple attackers [8], [9].
In the past, various approaches have been proposed to address intrusion prediction and detec-
tion challenges related to multi-stage attacks. These approaches can, in general, be categorized
as correlation based techniques [10]–[12] or machine learning (ML) based techniques. Examples
of ML techniques include Hidden Markov Models, Bayesian Networks, Clustering and Neural
Networks [2], [13]–[15]. Correlation-based techniques, based on cause and effect relationship,
mainly utilize attack-graphs in searching the possible stages of the attack [16]–[21]. For example,
the work in [17] focuses on the causal relationships between attack phases on the basis of
security information. The work in [18] assesses network security through mining and restoring
the attack paths within an attack graph. A causal relations graph presented in [19], contains the
low-level attack patterns in the form of their prerequisites and consequences. In that approach,
during the correlation phase, new search is performed upon the arrival of a new alert. Several
other techniques use similar ideas for analyzing attack scenarios from security alerts [20], [21].
However, most of these approaches depend on correlation rules in conjunction with the domain
3knowledge. Due to increased computational complexity in detecting real time attacks, these
techniques pose a limitation.
In the category of ML technique, HMM is a leading approach in intrusion detection and
prediction of multi-stages attacks [22]–[31]. In this approach, stages of an attack are modeled as
states of the HMM. The existing HMM based detection systems, however, are primarily focused
on single multi-stage attacks. HMM is considered the most suitable detection techniques for
such attacks for several reasons [22]. First, it has a tractable mathematical formalism in terms
of analyzing input-output relationships, and generating transition probability matrices based on
training dataset. Second, because it is specialized to deal with sequential data by exploiting
transition probability between states, it can track the progress of a multi-stage attack.
Existing approaches address only a single multi-stage attack. The problem of detecting multiple
interleaved multi-stage attacks has not been addressed in the literature. Several challenges are
faced for detecting interleaved attacks which include: (1) how to model each multi-stage attack
in terms of HMM states in the presence of mixed observations, (2) how to detect a multi-stage
attack when an attacker(s) performs interleaved attacks with the intention to hide an attack,
(3) since there is no standard public dataset available that provides interleaved traffic from
simultaneous multiple attacks, generating this type of datasets poses a challenge, (4) design an
efficient architecture that detects and tracks the progress of multiple simultaneous attacks, and
(5) how to accurately quantify and measure the detection performance of such an architecture.
To address the above challenges, in this paper, we propose two architectures based on HMM
formalism. The proposed architectures exhibit varying detection performance and processing
complexities. The architectures can detect the occurrence of multiple organized attacks and pro-
vide insights about the dynamics of these attacks such as identifying which attack is progressing
and which one is idle at any point of time; how fast or slow each attack is progressing; and in
which security state each attack is in at a certain time. Knowledge of these insights can assist
in designing effective response mechanisms that can mitigate security risk to the network [1],
[32]. The design of the first proposed architecture relies on modifying HMM model parameters
to detect multiple multi-stage attacks in the presence of mixed alerts. While on the other hand,
the second proposed architecture relies on de-interleaving mixed alerts from different attacks
prior to the HMM processing subsystem. We compare the two architectures in terms of their
detection performance and design complexity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model in Section
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Fig. 1: A generic architecture for multiple multi-stage attack detection using an HMM database
II. We present the proposed architectures in Section III and evaluation and performance measures
in Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
In order to detect multiple multi-stage attacks, say K attacks, one can generalize the existing
single attack architecture by building a database of K HMM templates. In Fig. 1, we present
a generic architecture for the threat detection process that uses such a database. Here, each
HMM-based template, is designed to detect a specific type of multi-stage attack. The goal of
this architecture is to detect K multi-step attacks originated from a single or multiple attackers.
Note, each of the K HMM templates is trained for detecting an individual multi-step attack.
Each template encompasses the HMM structure including the transition probability matrix and
a number of states [33].
The second major component of this architecture is the intrusion detection system (IDS),
(e.g., SNORT software [34], [35]), which generates the attack related alerts in real time from
the network traffic according to a predefined set of rules. Typically, an IDS generates a stream
of alerts which are temporally ordered based on their timestamps. The online processing of this
stream of alerts can potentially require a large amount of memory [36]. The selection of IDS
rules can help in reducing the large volume of alerts, as well as can reduce false positives. The
interleaved alerts generated by SNORT can belong to one or multiple attacks. These alerts can
be preprocessed to generate observations in a suitable format that can be forwarded to the HMM
5database. Based on the information from SNORT, preprocessing module can assign different
severity levels for the incoming alerts. The higher the level is, the more severe the alert is,
which indicates that an ongoing multi-stage attack is progressing towards an advanced stage.
In this paper, the incoming alerts to the system are grouped to form an observation sequence
of length T . Note, the risk of progressing multi-stage attacks can be assessed in real time by
the risk assessment component and prioritized response actions can be taken based on detected
states and the risk of the active attacks [1].
In the following, we present a preliminary discussion about HMM formalism and subsequently,
in Section III, we use this model to build the proposed architectures.
A. Hidden Markov Model Description
An HMM is a doubly stochastic process [33] with an underlying stochastic process that is
hidden, and can only be observed through another set of stochastic processes that produce the
sequence of observed symbols. The observation process corresponds to alerts generated by the
IDS. In this section, we provide mathematical preliminaries for the discrete HMM in the context
of multiple multi-stage attacks. Consider that each attack is modeled using a distinct HMM
model λk that encompasses all the following parameters,
λk = {Sk, Vk, Ak, Bk, pik}, k = 1, 2, . . . , K (1)
where Sk = {s1k , . . . , snk , . . . , sNk}, snk represents State n of Attack k, and Nk is the number
of states in Attack k. Note, for multiple attacks, different attacks can have different values
of N . In this paper, for simplicity of HMM computations, we assume that ongoing multi-
stage attacks in the network can be modeled with the same number of security states. Vk =
{v1k , . . . , vmk , . . . , vMk} represents distinct observation symbols set for Attack k, where Mk is
the total number of distinct observations for Attack k. In our model, we consider both the cases
of Vi ∩ Vj = φ and Vi ∩ Vj 6= φ, for j 6= i, and j, i = 1, 2, . . . , K. That is, any two multi-
stage attacks can have the same set of observations. Ak represents the state transition probability
matrix of Attack k with dimension Nk × Nk. Each element in this matrix, aij , represents the
state transition probability form state i to state j as follows:
aij = P (xt+1 = sj|xt = si),
1 ≤ i ≤ Nk, 1 ≤ j ≤ Nk, xt ∈ Sk
6Bk is the observation emission probability matrix with dimension Nk × Mk. The emission
probability of the mth observation of state j is represented by bj(m), as follows:
bj(m) = Pr(ot = vm|xt = sj),
1 ≤ j ≤ Nk, 1 ≤ m ≤Mk
Initial probability distribution vector (pi) represents initial states probabilities of the HMM states
with pii = Pr(x1 = si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The observation sequence (O) of length T for HMM is
represented as O = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT} where ot ∈ Vk. As indicated in [33], HMM can deal
with three main problems which are, the evaluation, hidden state decoding, and model training.
Note, all of these problems need to be addressed for designing our architectures.
1) HMM model Type: An important consideration that needs to be taken into account when
choosing HMM for an application, is the type of the model. There are mainly two types of HMM
in terms of state transition diagram. One is called ergodic HMM or fully connected HMM, in
which every state of the model can be reached from every other state in a single step [33]. The
other type of HMM is the left-right HMM which has the property that as the time progresses,
the state number increases, i.e., state transition proceeds from left to right and there is no return
transition. This type of modeling puts a constraint on the state probability matrix such that:
aij = 0, j < i
The left-right HMM model is suitable for the type of applications where states change over time.
This applies to the problem of a multi-stage attack that progresses over time to reach the goal
of compromising a certain target. Even though the attacker sometimes may perform actions that
are supposed to lead to lower security states from the current state for reasons depend on the
type of attack, the left-right HMM does not allow transition to a lower state. Therefore, one of
the proposed architectures is modeled using a modified HMM model where right-left transitions
are allowed for a specific state as discussed in Section III-A.
2) The Number of HMM States: The selection of the optimum number of states for each
HMM template is a challenge and there is no simple theoretical answer to how, in general, this
parameter can be selected [33]. This parameter depends on the type of application. In this paper,
we model the number of HMM states to be similar to the number of stages of the multi-stage
attack. The justification is that the closer the number of states to the number of stages in the
multi-stage attack, the better details can be provided about the progress of the attack and thus,
it can lead to the development of more effective response mechanism.
73) HMM Model Training: The most important part of the HMM database in the generic
architecture of the detection system (Fig. 1) is the parameterization of HMMs in terms of
determining both Ak and Bk matrices in (1) to maximize probability Pr(O|λk) for each multi-
stage attack. There are several unsupervised training algorithms, such as Baum-Welch (BW) and
Expectation Maximization (EM) [33]. In this paper, we use BW training algorithm as it is the
most widely used algorithm and it is a special case of the EM method applied to HMM training
[33]. Furthermore, since we have a limited availability of public datasets with multiple multi-
stage attacks, we train HMMs with a small number of training data points, although practically
the larger the number of training data points the better the model is, and thus the better detection
accuracy can be obtained [29].
B. Modeling Interleaved Attacks
We assume K distinct multi-stage attacks that are launched simultaneously in a network, and
their related alerts, generated by IDS, are forwarded to the HMM database in a form of a stream
of interleaved alerts. These alerts can be the result of a systematic interleaving of multiple multi-
stage attacks initiated by a single attacker or can be generated randomly by different attackers.
Note, for each observation length (T ), we assume T alerts are processed by the HMM system.
In particular, at any time, it is possible that these T alerts can be from one attack or a mix of
at most K attacks. Some possible interleaved attack scenarios that can be formed systematically
or randomly are described as follows:
• An attacker starts and finishes an attack (Attack 1) in the middle of another ongoing
attack (Attack 2).
• Multiple attacks start and finish at different times in the presence of one or multiple
ongoing attacks.
• Stages of one attack can be embedded at different times across another ongoing at-
tack(s).
• Stages of multiple attacks can be embedded at different times of an ongoing attack(s).
• Systematic interleaving among multiple multi-stage attacks based on interleaving groups
of alerts.
Existing publicly available datasets, that have multi-stage attacks, do not consider these com-
plex attack scenarios. The DARPA2000 alerts dataset, for instance, contains two distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) multi-stage attacks that happened at different times where the attacker
8uses multiple distributed compromised hosts to launch DoS attacks on a specific target [37]. To
address the challenge of generating the aforementioned interleaved attack scenarios, we generate
interleaved alerts by altering timestamps and IP addresses of the DARPA2000 dataset.
In order to detect the aforementioned attack scenarios, we propose two architectures based
on the generic architecture shown in Fig. 1. The design of the first architecture is based on
modifying HMM model parameters to deal with the interleaved alerts. Since the same alert
stream is processed by all the HMM templates in the database, Architecture I suffers from high
false negatives when multi-stage attacks are highly interleaved, as discussed later in the paper.
Therefore, we propose a second architecture, Architecture II, to improve the detection capability
by separating alerts from different attacks prior to routing alerts to HMM sub-system.
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURES
A. Proposed Architecture I
In order to deal with interleaved traffic alerts from different attacks, we modify HMM of the
generic architecture in Fig. 1 to accommodate observations from different attacks. We assume
K HMM templates are trained for K distinct multi-stage attacks. The stream of alerts generated
by the IDS contains alerts that belong to one or more concurrent attacks. That is, for each
observation length T , there are T observations (o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT ) processed by the HMM
detection system, as shown in Fig. 2. Arrival of these alerts represents the interleaved attacks
mentioned in Section II-B. The HMMk template is trained for Attack k, therefore, out of T
observations, HMMk is expected to distinguish and process only those observations that belong to
its attack, for which this HMM has been designed for. Note, among T observations, there are Lk
observations (i.e., {o1k , o2k , . . . , oLk}) belong to Attack k, and the remaining T−Lk observations
are considered by HMMk as unrelated (interfering) alerts. We introduce a common state that
encompasses all the unrelated alerts in HMMk. In this paper, for HMM structure, we focus
on the alerts only, that is, no packets belonging to normal traffic are processed. Consequently,
no normal state is considered in each HMM template. Therefore, the most likely state that
can be inferred by observing T − Lk unrelated observations using HMMk is the State 1. In
other words, the occurrence of these interfering observations leads to the lowest security state
(State 1) in the HMMk. To deal with these unrelated observations in parameterizing HMMk, we
introduce a new symbol, {ot /∈ Vk}, that represents all unrelated observations for Attack k. This
requires modifying HMM parameters, (i. e., matrices Ak and Bk of (1)). This can be obtained
9by considering an observation ot, such that {ot /∈ Vk}. Accordingly, we add an extra column in
the emission probability matrix, Bk, to account for this new symbol, as follows:
Bk =

b11 b12 · · · b1Mk 1
b21 b22 · · · b2Mk 0
...
... . . .
...
bNk1 bNk2 · · · bNkMk 0

Note, transition to State 1, in the presence of unrelated observation ot, occurs with probability 1
which has a very small value (such as < 1×10−6) chosen such that ∑Mj=1 b1j = 1. Accordingly,
almost no change is made to the other observation probabilities in the first row of the emission
probability matrix. In addition, setting the probability to zero in the rest of the last column
increases the probability that observing {ot /∈ Vk} leads to State 1. A second modification is
needed for the transition probability matrix (Ak) to ensure that whenever HMMk observes the
T −Lk alerts from attacks other than Attack k, transition to State 1 occurs. This can be done by
introducing transition probability (2) in the first column of the Ak matrix. Although our initial
assumption is a left-right model, in this architecture, instead of adding a new state to the model
we let all other states return only to State 1 whenever alerts from unrelated attacks occur. An
important advantage of modeling unrelated alerts in this way is that it simplifies the training of
each HMM. Subsequently, by introducing 2, matrix Ak becomes as follows:
Ak =

a11 a12 · · · a1Nk
2 a22 · · · a2Nk
...
... . . .
...
2 0 · · · aNkNk

Based on this modification and training of the HMM template (λk), the evaluation module
determines whether Attack k is active or not, as shown in Fig. 2, according to the criteria
Pr(O|λk) ≥ thr. Note, thr is a threshold used to avoid unnecessary computations of the Viterbi
algorithm module in case the attack is not active. The thr value can be chosen in the range of 0
to 0.5. However, with the larger the value of thr, HMM template (λk) estimates only the states
of the high probability sequences. In this paper, we take a conservative approach in choosing
thr = 0. The evaluation probability can be computed using the forward algorithm [33]. In case
Attack k is active, then HMMk (λk) runs the Viterbi algorithm to decode the most probable
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hidden states that correspond to the given observation sequence O = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT}, as
follows:
xt = max
1≤i≤Nk
γt(i)
γt(i) = Pr(xt = si|O, λk)
t = 1, . . . , T
(2)
where γt(i) represents the probability of being in state si at time t based on the observation
sequence. In Architecture I, each HMM template in Fig. 2 uses the Viterbi algorithm to find
the best state sequence, X = {x1, . . . , xt, . . . , xT}. For a given observation sequence, Viterbi
algorithm finds the highest probability along a single path for every ot (t ≤ T ) and ot its
corresponding state si such that:
δt(i) = argmax
s1,...,st−1
Pr(s1, . . . , st, o1, . . . , ot|λk) (3)
Using induction the algorithm determines the rest of the state sequence, as follows:
δt+1(j) = argmax
1≤i≤Nk
{δt(i)aij(k)}.bi(ot+1(k)) (4)
Stream of 
interleaved alerts
maxi p(Si |O, λ1)
i= 1,2,…NEvaluationP(O|λ1) > thr
maxi p(Si |O, λ2)
i= 1,2,..NEvaluationP(O|λ2) > thr
maxi p(Si |O, λK)
i= 1,2,..NEvaluationP(O|λK) > thr
Attack1
performance
Attack2
performance
AttackK
performance
O= O1, O2, O3,….., OT
Alert
Pre-
Processing
HMM1
HMMK
Fig. 2: Architecture I
This computation for the same given sequence is repeated by all other HMM templates in the
Architecture I (Fig. 2). Table I shows the overall processing of alerts based on Architecture I.
The limitation with Architecture I is that there is a high probability of high false negatives,
especially when the attacks are highly interleaved. This is because each HMM template will
most likely process an observation sequence that contains interfering observations belong to
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other attacks. More details about detection performance of Architecture I is given in Section IV.
To overcome this limitation, we propose another variation of the generic architecture of Fig. 1.
The new architecture, termed as Architecture II, is depicted in Fig. 3 and is discussed below.
TABLE I: Detection process for Architecture I
Input: interleaved alerts: O = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT },
pik: λk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
Output: X = {x1, x2, . . . , xT }
1 While (O is not empty)
2 for k = 1 : K
3 if (Pr(O|λk ≥ thr)
4 for t = 1 : T
5 Compute γt(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , Nk from equation (2)
6 xt = max
1≤i≤Nk
γt(i)
7 endfor
8 endif
9 endfor
10 endWhile
B. Proposed Architecture II
Again, we consider K interleaved multi-stage attacks that can be simultaneously launched
in the network. The IDS system, based on SNORT, generates alerts from these attacks. Every
alert is generated with a set of features, which includes alert ID, source/destination IP address,
source/destination port number, and timestamp. In Architecture II, we use these features to
improve detection efficiency of HMM templates. In particular, unrelated observations that do
not belong to the kth attack are separated and passed to their respective HMMs. Note, the major
design philosophy behind Architecture II is to use aforementioned features to preprocess the
online network traffic stream and demultiplex it into multiple substreams, as shown in Fig. 3.
We refer to this preprocessing step as a demultiplexing step. It is an important step as it helps
in eliminating the number of interfering observations from other attacks that are not detectable
by a particular HMM.
12
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Note, alerts triggered by the same attack scenario are correlated based on some features, (e.g.,
the source and destination IP addresses). We define alert (oi) as a 7-tuple features (timestamp,
ID, srcIP, srcPort, desIP, desPort, priority) according to the IDMEF [38], [39]. We refer to this
tuple as a feature set F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7}. The timestamp represents date and time of
an alert generated by the IDS. ID is the identification of the alert, srcIP and srcPort indicate the
source IP address and source port number, respectively. Also, desIP and desPort represent the
destination IP address and port number, respectively, and priority indicates the alert’s rank [10].
A subset, S, from the feature set F (S ⊂ F ) can be used for demultiplexing operation. The
simplest way in which we can demultiplex interleaved alerts is by grouping the alerts that are
triggered by the same multi-stage attack into a one subsequence based on their IP addresses
relationships, as illustrated in Fig. 4, i.e., S = {f3, f5}. Note, IP addresses of the alerts, which
are triggered by the same attack scenario, are generally related. Consider that there are two alerts,
oi and oj . The demultiplexer searches for these addresses to check if they have the same srcIP,
or the same desIP. Moreover, it also checks whether destIP of the previous alert is the same as
the srcIP of the next one, as in a multi-stage attack scenario, the destination node of an earlier
alert is the source node of the next alert. Based on the IP address search, the demultiplexer either
inserts oi and oj in the same subsequence or in different ones.
The demultiplexer performs stream demultiplexing function into L substreams (1 ≤ L ≤ K).
The demultiplexing process is based on one or more aforementioned distinguishing feature(s) of
the incoming alerts. Therefore, from the incoming stream of alerts, O = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT},
13
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Fig. 4: Alert sequence demultiplexed into multiple subsequences based on IP addresses only
the demultiplexer generates L substreams each of which belongs to a distinct multi-stage attack.
These substreams are a subset of O, which are represented as, O1 = {o11 , o21 , . . . , oT1}, Ok =
{o1k , o2k , . . . , oTk}, and so on till OL = {o1L , o2L , . . . , oTL}, where L ≤ K and Tk ≤ T . Note,
the larger the feature subset we consider in stream demultiplexing, the more distinct substreams
we obtain and, in turn, the more processing is entailed. Note, within an observation sequence,
alerts can belong to L attacks where 1 ≤ L ≤ K.
The demultiplexer module does not distinguish among types of attacks, therefore, it cannot
route a substream to its corresponding HMM template. To address this issue in Architecture II,
each HMM can have L instances, each of which can process one single substream. Thus, all the
L generated substreams pass through each HMM to find which subsequence matches a certain
HMM. The computation by each instance is performed based on the posterior probability given
in (5).
O∗k = max
1≤l≤L
Pr(Ol|λl), L ≤ K (5)
Note, this probability computation is performed L × K times. The next stage of the HMM
process is to estimate state probabilities for its corresponding subsequence, O∗k, found from (5)
using the Viterbi decoding algorithm, as follows:
xt = max
1≤i≤Nk
γt(i)
γt(i) = Pr(xt = si|Ok, λk)
t = 1, . . . , Tk
(6)
Unlike Architecture I, the first stage of every HMM in Architecture II has a maximum of K
instances of the forward algorithm and one instance of the Viterbi algorithm. In addition, the
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TABLE II: Detection process for Architecture II
Input: interleaved alerts: O = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, . . . , oT },
pik: λk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
Output: X = {x1, x2, . . . , xT }
1 While (O is not empty)
2 Demultiplex sequence O into L subsequences, O1, O2, . . . , OL
3 for k = 1 : K
4 for l = 1 : L
5 Compute (Pr(Ol|λk)
6 endfor(l)
7 Find O∗k = max
1≤l≤L
Pr(Ol|λk)
8 for t = 1 : Tk, Tk is the length of sequence O∗k
9 Compute γt(i) = Pr(xt = si|O∗k, λk), from equation (6)
10 xt = max
1≤i≤Nk
γt(i)
11 endfor(t)
12 endfor(k)
13 endWhile
HMM in Architecture II deals with subsequences of length Tk, where Tk ≤ T . Table II shows
the overall processing of alerts based on Architecture II.
C. Complexity Comparison between Proposed Architectures
Note, in Architectures I and II in Figs. 2 and 3, the main modules that contribute to the
computational complexity are the alert preprocessing module for assigning alert severity, the
stream demultiplexing module, and the HMM parallel branch modules. The first preprocessing
module is the same for both architectures; however, the demultiplexing module exists only
in Architecture II, which requires a demultiplexing of all T alerts based on a subset (S) of
alert features considered in the demultiplexing operation. The larger the T and S sets are, the
more complex computation is required by this module. In other words, Architecture II has
T × |S| additional complexity requirement as compared with Architecture I as a result of the
demultiplexing operation.
Next, we consider the HMM database component of the architectures. Note, two algorithms
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are needed to be executed in each branch of the HMM database; the Forward (FW) algorithm to
compute posterior probability for the evaluation purpose and the Viterbi algorithm to estimate the
best state sequence. In Architecture I, every incoming sequence of T alerts is processed by all
K branches. In other words, K computations of FW algorithm plus K computations of Viterbi
algorithm are performed. On the other hand, in Architecture II, each HMM module deals, on the
average, with a shorter sequence length compared to the case in Architecture I. In the first module
of each branch, FW algorithm is required to be executed L times, and in the second module of the
branch, the Viterbi algorithm is executed once. Therefore, in Architecture II, L×K computations
of FW algorithm plus L computations of the Viterbi algorithm are performed. It is important
to note that although Architecture II seems to perform more number of computations in HMM
database, the length of sequences processed by both FW and the Viterbi algorithms is, on the
average, shorter than the sequences in Architecture I. The primary shortcoming of Architecture
II is the computation overhead needed for the demultiplexing operation. This overhead can be
high especially for the case of a large value of T and a large number of features.
IV. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
In this section, we discuss our experimental results based on the DARPA2000 dataset [37],
which contains two DDoS multi-stage attacks labeled as LLDDOS 1.0 and LLDDOS 2.0.2. Both
of these attacks have five stages, that can be summarized as IP sweeping, Sadmind probing,
Sadmind exploit, DDoS software installation and Launching. In our experiment, DARPA2000
raw network packets were processed by SNORT intrusion detection system [34] to generate
alerts. The total number of alerts results from this process is 3500 and 2000, for LLDDOS 1.0
and LLDDOS 2.0.2 attacks, respectively. These alerts are clustered into 12 distinct symbols.
Therefore, Mk = 12, k = 1, 2, as mentioned in Section II-A. The preprocessing module assigns
a severity level to these alerts based on their relation to the stages of multi-stage attacks. In case
there are more than one alert which lead to a state, the higher the severity level is given to the
alert which indicates that the attack is progressing. Accordingly, Tables III and IV show alert
severity, alert type and states of both attacks [26].
The training of the two HMMs is conducted based on a five state model (Nk = 5, k = 1, 2),
which corresponds to five stages in each attack. The state diagrams of HMM1 for Attack 1
and HMM2 for Attack 2 are shown in Fig. 5. The parameterization of each HMM is given
in Appendix A. The training of HMMs in terms of computation of observations and states
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Alert Severity Alert Type State
1 ICMP PING 1
2 ICMP Echo Reply 1
3 ICMP PING BSDtype 1
4 ICMP PING Unix 1
5 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP attempt 2
6 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 2
7 RPC sadmind UDP PING 2
8 RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 3
9 RPC sadmind UDP NETMGT CLIENT overflow attempt 3
10 SERVICES rsh root 4
11 TELNET login 4
12 SNMP AgentX/tcp request 5
and flood DDoS attempt
TABLE III: Correspondence between Alert type, Alert Severity
and States in DARPA LLDDOS 1.0
Alert Severity Alert Type State
1 RPC portmap sadmind request UDP 1
2 RPC portmap Solaris sadmind port query udp request 1
3 RPC portmap Solaries sadmind port query 1
4 udp portmapper sadmind port query attempt 1
5 RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP 2
6 RPC sadmind UDP 2
7 sadmind UDP NETMGT CLIENT overflow attempt 2
8 RPC portmap Solaries sadmind port query - Diff. IP 3
9 RPC sadmind query with root credentials attempt UDP - Diff. IP 3
10 RPC sadmind UDP - Diff. IP 4
11 sadmind UDP NETMGT CLIENT overflow attempt - Diff. IP 4
12 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 5
and flood DDoS attempt
TABLE IV: Correspondence between Alert type, Alert Severity
and States in DARPA LLDDOS 2.0.2
probabilities are based on the machine learning toolbox in MATLAB [40]. For the purpose of
training, we use 30% of the dataset, while the rest of the dataset was used for testing. In this
evaluation, parameters 1 and 2 of models λ1 and λ2 of Architecture I are chosen as 1 = 10−6
and 2 = 10−3.
For the completeness of our evaluation, we present the detection performance of the two multi-
stage attacks using their respective HMMs when these attacks occur one at a time. Subsequently,
several scenarios of the two simultaneous attacks are generated with a varying degree of interleav-
ing to test the performance of the proposed architectures. For some cases, we compare the three
architectures of Figs. 1, 2, and 3. The reason for using the generic architecture of Fig. 1 for the
comparison is that, no evaluation has been done in the literature for multiple multistage attacks.
For all the results, the x-axis shows the running count of alerts as they are generated by SNORT.
For the purpose of evaluation, we propose three performance metrics, in addition to the widely
used state probability metric [26]. The proposed metrics are: (1) attack risk probability which
provides an insight about the speed of attacks and can help in prioritizing response actions, (2)
detection error rate performance, which measures how much error is generated by an architecture
in estimating states, and (3) the number of correctly detected stages. The justification of these
performance metrics is given in the following subsections.
A. Detection of Individual DARPA2000 Attacks
In this subsection, we first consider the alerts generated by SNORT when only LLDDOS 1.0
dataset is used. We pass these alerts to the alerts preprocessing module and then to HMM1
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
(a) HMM1
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
(b) HMM2
Fig. 5: State Diagrams for HMM1 and HMM2
which is trained to detect the first DDoS attack (Attack 1). The same is done for LLDDOS 2.0.2
dataset to detect the second DDoS attack (Attack 2). The state probability results of each attack
is shown in Fig. 6. It can be noted that the five stages of each attack are detected by each HMM.
It can also be noted that Attack 2 is relatively faster than Attack 1, as few alerts are needed by
Attack 2 to reach the last stage of HMM2 indicating the launching of the DDoS attack on the
target. In Fig. 6 we show the estimated state corresponding to only the first 500 alerts out of all
the SNORT alerts as the remaining alerts are almost all the same and lead to the compromise
state (State 5). The observation length for this case is taken as T = 100.
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(b) Attack 2
Fig. 6: State probability of HMM1 and HMM 2 for individual DARPA attacks
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B. Generating Alerts Interleaving Scenarios
Based on the two multi-stage attacks in the DARPA2000 dataset, we altered the timestamp
of some of alerts in both attacks so that we can generate a single sequence of alerts that is
composed of a mix of the two attacks without altering the temporal order of the original alerts.
In addition, the IP addresses of the hosts attacked by Attack 2 (LLDDOS 2.0.2) are also changed.
The reason for this modification is to simulate two simultaneous attacks intruding a network.
Fig. 7 shows several scenarios of interleaved alerts for two simultaneous DDoS attacks. Note, the
degree of interleaving increases from Scenario 1 to 4 indicating more sophistication of actions
and complexity of attacks. Since Attack 2 takes shorter time to compromise the target and
launch DDoS, we manipulate timestamps of Attack 2 so that it spreads across different times of
Attack 1. The y-axis in Fig. 7 represents the alert severity based on the preprocessing module as
depicted in Tables III and IV. Based on these scenarios the performance results of the proposed
architectures are given in the following subsections.
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Fig. 7: Interleaved alerts scenarios from LLDDOS 1.0 and LLDDOS 2.0.2 attacks
C. Probability of State Estimation and the Effect of Interleaving
In this subsection, we present the state probability, γt(i), from (2) and (6) for i = 1, . . . , 5 with
two observation lengths, T = 10 and T = 500. For T = 500, it can be seen from Figs. 8a and
8b that Architecture I can estimate1 the states of both attacks with a high probability, especially
1Note: The terms detecting a state and estimating a state are used interchangeably in this paper
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for States 1, 2, 4, and 5. However, as the degree of interleaving increases from Scenario 1 to
Scenario 4, Architecture I fails to detect many states. For example, for Scenario 3, States 3 and
4 of Attack 2 are not detected, as depicted in Fig. 8c. For Scenario 4, Architecture I performs
very poorly as it fails to detect all the states of both attacks, as depicted in Fig. 8d. For T = 10,
Architecture I shows a small improvement in detecting States 3 and 4 for Scenarios 1 and 3,
respectively, as can be seen from Fig. 8 and Fig. 10 . The reason for this poor performance of
Architecture I, is that as the degree of interleaving between alerts increases, the more interfering
alerts can exist within a given sequence, causing the Viterbi algorithm to incorrectly determine
the state probability of the non-interfering alerts.
Architecture II, on the other hand, performs better as compared to Architecture I in terms of
estimating correct states of all incoming alerts for both T = 10 and T = 500. This performance
improvement even for a higher degrees of interleaving can be observed from Figs. 8c, 8d, 9c,
9d, 10c, 10d, 11c, and 11d. The reason behind this performance improvement for Architecture
II is the presence of the demultiplexing module that helps each HMM to process only relevant
attack alerts. Note, for both architectures the state probability for State 3 of Attack 1 is very
low for both values of T . The reason is there are not enough alerts produced by SNORT for
this stage.
We observe discontinuity in the state probability plot of Architecture I in Figs. 8 and 10, which
is due to the fact that both HMMs return to State 1 whenever there exist interfering alerts from
other attacks. However, in Architecture II, as the alerts from different attacks are demultiplexed
prior to their processing by HMMs, the states of HMMs are not interrupted. Fig. 12 shows the
importance of considering 2 in designing HMM used by Architecture I. In this experiment,
we choose 2 = 0.001, which is a small value that does not significantly affect the transition
probability matrices, A1 and A2, obtained from training. Note, 2 = 0 represents the case of
generic architecture, for which returning to State 1 is not allowed when HMM1 receives alerts
belong to Attack 2 or when HMM2 receives alerts belong to Attack 1. Setting 2 = 0 reduces
the accuracy of state detection for the two attacks, as can be seen in Fig. 12. For example, for
interleaving Scenario 2, Fig. 12a provides no estimate for state probability of States 2 and 4 for
the first 200 alerts when 2 = 0, as compared to Fig. 12b when 2 = 0.001. Similar observation
can be made by comparing Figs. 12c and 12d for the first 350 alerts of State 2.
In summery, Figs. 8, 9, 10, and 11 show that there is no significant change in the state detection
performance of each architecture as the observation length changes from 10 to 500 alerts.
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Fig. 8: State probability of Attacks 1 and 2 detected by HMM1 and HMM2 based on Architecture I, T=500
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Fig. 9: State probability of Attacks 1 and 2 detected by HMM1 and HMM2 based on Architecture II, T=500
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Fig. 10: State probability of Attacks 1 and 2 detected by HMM1 and HMM2 based on Architecture I, T=10
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Fig. 11: State probability of Attacks 1 and 2 detected by HMM1 and HMM2 based on Architecture II, T=10
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(b) Sc 2, 2 = 0.001
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(d) Sc 3, 2 = 0.001
Fig. 12: Effect of 2 on state probability based on Architecture I
Moreover, Architecture II is more robust in terms of having better state probability estimation
metric at a higher degree of interleaving as compared to Architecture I.
D. Attack Risk Probability
We define the first proposed performance metric as the attack risk probability, which is the
probability of how far an attack is from compromising the target, i. e., reaching the final state. The
calculation of this attack probability depends on the estimated state probability (γt(i)) averaged
over the total number of states. Its value gets updated at every observation length in a non-
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decreasing manner, as shown below in (7):
Prattackk(t) =
∑Nk
i=1 γt(i)si
Nk
t = 1, . . . , T i = 1, . . . , Nk, k = 1, . . . , 2
(7)
This performance measure can help in tracking the progress of each attack, especially when there
are multiple organized attacks. It can be noted that, the rate at which the attack risk probability
changes with respect to alerts gives an indication of how fast or slow an attack is progressing.
Consequently, this measure can help in prioritizing response actions for each ongoing attack.
Figs. 13 and 14 show the attack risk probability for both DARPA multi-stage attacks using
Architecture I and II for different interleaving scenarios and for the two observation lengths,
T = 10 and T = 500. The results shown are for Scenarios 3 and 4, as they are relatively
more complex to detect. Fig. 14 shows that Architecture II can track the progress of Attacks
1 and 2 for both interleaving scenarios accurately based on the knowledge of the generated
input alerts shown in Figs. 7c and 7d. Note, there is no significant difference between the case
of T = 10, and T = 500. Also note, after 100 alerts, Attack 2 progresses relatively fast, and
reaches the compromise state well before Attack 1. However, on the other hand, Architecture I
underestimates the progress of Attacks 1 and 2, as shown in Figs. 13c and 13d. This is because
Architecture I fails to detect some of the states for Scenarios 3 and 4, as illustrated in the
previous subsection. Fig. 13c shows that both attacks progress at a slow pace. However, this
is not true as depicted in Fig. 14c where Architecture II shows both attacks progress fast at
different paces. For instance, Attack 2 reaches 80% after 100 alerts, while Attack 1 reaches 80%
after 300 alerts. Moreover, Fig. 13d shows that Attack 1 progresses faster than Attack 2, which
is also not true, as depicted in Fig. 14d that indicates Attack 2 is faster than Attack 1. This
inaccurate detection of these attacks can adversely affect response decisions, especially, when a
priority-based response mechanism is employed [1].
E. Error Rate Performance
The next performance measure we propose is the error rate (ER), which is the ratio of the
number of errors due to the inconsistency between the type of an alert and the corresponding
estimated state to the total number of incoming alerts. Formally, ER is given by the following
equation:
ER =
Number of incorrect detected states of the incoming Alerts
Total number of Alerts
× 100 (8)
23
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
alerts 
A
tt
a
c
k
 R
is
k
 P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
  
Observation length, T=500
 
 
Attack 1
Attack 2
(a) Scenario 3
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
alerts 
A
tt
a
c
k
 R
is
k
 P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
  
Observation length, T=10
 
 
Attack 1
Attack 2
(b) Scenario 3
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
alerts 
A
tt
a
c
k
 R
is
k
 P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
  
Observation length, T=500
 
 
Attack 1
Attack 2
(c) Scenario 4
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
alerts 
A
tt
a
c
k
 R
is
k
 P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
  
Observation length, T=10
 
 
Attack 1
Attack 2
(d) Scenario 4
Fig. 13: Attack risk probability based on Architecture I
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Fig. 14: Attack risk probability based on Architecture II
Note, the exact state corresponding to every incoming alert is considered based on the knowledge
of the input alerts and their corresponding states, according to Tables III and IV. Note also, ER
is equivalent to the false negative rate. The reasons for inconsistency between type of alerts and
their detected states are: (1) the presence of interfering alerts, and (2) the state estimation error
resulted from the enforcement of the left-right HMM model.
Fig. (15) shows the plot of ER for different interleaving scenarios and for several values of
T . It can be seen from the figure that the proposed architectures outperform generic architecture
(Fig. (1)) for interleaving Scenarios 1,2, and 3. However, for Scenario 4, both Architecture I
and generic architecture have similar ER, which is higher than Architecture II. It can also be
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noted that the ER for Architecture II remains almost constant with respect to T and is also
the same for all scenarios. Similarly, Architecture I has almost constant ER with respect to T .
However, its ER performance gets worse as the degree of interleaving increases as compared
to Architecture II. For instance, for Scenario 4, ER for Architecture I is as high as 77% as
compared to Architecture II which has a value of 22%.
Note, for generic architecture, the ER generally increases with T and saturates to a value.
The main reason is the same as aforementioned reason (1) and the lack of capability of this
architecture to distinguish between alerts from two different attacks. In addition, due to the same
reason, its ER also increases from Scenario 1 through Scenario 4.
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Fig. 15: State detection error rate at various interleaving scenarios
F. Number of Correctly Detected Stages per Attack
The third performance measure we propose is the number of correctly detected stages per
attack, which allows us to analyze the security impact due to missing or incorrectly detecting
stages in a multi-stage attack, especially from the point of view of considering response actions.
We compare between architectures in terms of the number of detected stages per attack.
This measure is computed as follows. As we know the correspondence between alerts and
stages (or states) of the attacks based on the knowledge of the DARPA2000 dataset, as shown in
Tables III and IV, we compare the estimated states from each HMM with the exact states. Table
V provides the results for three different values of T . It can be observed that Architecture II
outperforms Architecture I in correctly detecting more stages for both attacks. The performance
of the two architectures is the same for the interleaving Scenario 2, as both of them can detect
stages 1, 2, 4, and 5 but not 3. This can also be seen in Figs. 8b, 9b, 10b, and 11b.
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For Scenarios 3 and 4, Architecture II detects more stages than Architecture I. For example,
all five stages of Attack 2 are detected in Scenario 3 using Architecture II for T = 500, while
Architecture I only detects Stages 1 and 5. Fig. 16 shows the estimated states by HMM2 for
Attack 2 using Scenario 3. It can be observed that with Architecture I, Stages 3 and 4 are not
detected. The advantage of Architecture II can be more apparent in Table V when the interleaving
Scenario 4 is used.
Fig. 16 and Table V show the importance of this performance metric in terms of how much lead
time is available to respond to ongoing attacks. For instance, Fig. 16b shows that Architecture
I detects State 2 then immediately detects State 5 of Attack 2, which implies that there is no
enough lead time available to respond to a progressing attack. While, on the other hand, Fig.
16c shows that Architecture II detects all states of Attack 2 in a correct sequence similar to the
synthesized input states of Attack 2 shown in Fig. 16a. This performance metric establishes the
importance of considering a large number of states in modeling HMM in essence that the effect
of missing a few number of sates does not drastically impact the lead time while making real
time response decisions to an ongoing multi-stage attack.
TABLE V: Number of Correctly Detected Stages per Attack at Various Interleaving Scenarios
Interleaving Scenario Architecture Attack T = 10 T = 100 T = 500
Scenario 2
I
Attack 1 4 4 4
Attack 2 5 5 5
II
Attack 1 4 4 4
Attack 2 5 5 5
Scenario 3
I
Attack 1 4 4 5
Attack 2 4 4 3
II
Attack 1 4 5 5
Attack 2 5 5 5
Scenario 4
I
Attack 1 1 1 1
Attack 2 1 1 1
II
Attack 1 4 5 5
Attack 2 5 5 5
G. Extension to a higher number of attacks
The evaluation experiments in this paper were implemented with two simultaneous interleaved
attacks because of the limited available datasets of multiple attacks. However, it can be observed
that our proposed architectures can work easily with more than two simultaneous attacks. In
particular, Architecture II can perform well since it depends essentially on the demultiplexing
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Fig. 16: Comparison between Architectures I and II in detecting stages of Attack 2 for Scenario 3
operation. With more than two attacks, we expect more computations, especially in the demul-
tiplexing module and also in the HMM database component. Architecture I can also work well
with more than two attacks, but its detection performance deteriorates significantly with a large
number of attacks and a higher degree of interleaving.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the detection problem of interleaved multiple multi-stage attacks intrud-
ing a computer network. We propose two architectures based a well known machine learning
technique, i. e. Hidden Markov Model, and provide their performance results and computational
complexity. Both architectures can track interleaved attacks by obtaining the correct states of the
system for each incoming alert. However, as the degree of interleaving among attacks increases,
Architecture II, which employs a demultiplexing mechanism, exhibits better performance as
compared to Architecture I. For performance assessment of these architectures, we propose
three performance metrics which include (1) attack risk probability, (2) detection error rate, and
(3) the number of correctly detected stages.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research was supported by the grants from Northrop Grumman Corporation and US
National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant IIS-0964639.
27
APPENDIX A
HMM PARAMETERS
The two HMMs are trained using 30% of the DARPA2000 dataset, i.e. HMM1 is using
LLDDOS 1.0 and HMM2 is using LLDDOS 2.0.2 for training, while the rest of the dataset
was used for testing. The main parameters of HMM model in both attacks are determined from
training using the BW algorithm using MATLAB, and they are as follows:
A1 =

0.8550 0.1448 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0 0.9 0.0997 0.0001 0.0001
0 0 0.9880 0.0090 0.0001
0 0 0 0.9880 0.0090
0 0 0 0 1
 , A2 =

0.9287 0.0712 0.0001 0 0
0 0.9141 0.0857 0.0001 0
0 0 0.9387 0.0612 0.0001
0 0 0 0.9752 0.0248
0 0 0 0 1

B1 =

0.1131 0.1342 0.1397 0.1610 0.0861 0.1093 0.0955 0.0407 0.0999 0.0656 0.0970 0.0467
0.0884 0.1096 0.1335 0.0355 0.1185 0.1230 0.1266 0.1088 0.0803 0.0965 0.0593 0.0333
0.0095 0.0638 0.1138 0.1163 0.0201 0.1162 0.0536 0.1211 0.1127 0.1165 0.0577 0.0451
0.0719 0.1338 0.0688 0.1016 0.0796 0.0504 0.0487 0.0690 0.1016 0.1275 0.1382 0.0664
0.0297 0.0707 0.0771 0.0947 0.0349 0.1927 0.0115 0.0844 0.0553 0.0032 0.0207 0.1142

B2 =

0.1376 0.0291 0.0033 0.1538 0.1174 0.0049 0.0044 0.1838 0.1490 0.0304 0.1501 0.0361
0.0922 0.0651 0.1968 0.0427 0.1096 0.0941 0.1127 0.0089 0.0886 0.0358 0.0800 0.0736
0.0630 0.0568 0.1421 0.0052 0.0007 0.1598 0.1049 0.0798 0.0519 0.1332 0.0955 0.1071
0.0459 0.1605 0.1204 0.1586 0.0158 0.0075 0.1319 0.1817 0.1053 0.0160 0.0521 0.0041
0.0356 0.0408 0.0978 0.0841 0.0290 0.1304 0.0411 0.1242 0.1427 0.0693 0.0357 0.1693

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